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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of the firms’ behavior in the product market on their 
decisions at the R&D stage. We compare the consequences of the Stackelberg-type competition of two firms 
for the R&D investments with the situation of a cartelized industry under the assumption of quadratic cost 
functions. Numerical analysis shows that the lowest values of R&D efforts occur when the companies form a 
research joint venture. Moreover, greater R&D expenditures can be observed when a research joint venture is 
formed in a cartelized industry rather than under a Stackelberg-type duopoly. 
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1. Introduction 
R&D cooperation of firms in the high-tech industries is widespread. It takes place within institutionalized 
frameworks of special consortia, as well as in an informal way through the exchange of information between 
employees of different companies. As a result, the investments of one company to improve technology and to 
reduce the costs of production create positive externalities (knowledge spillovers) for the other firms in the 
industry by helping them to decrease their manufacturing costs.† The extent of spillovers becomes the largest 
in the case of research joint ventures, which allow for a complete mutual exchange of technological 
advancements. 
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Research joint ventures may help eliminate duplication of activities and allow for technological 
improvements at the lower investment expenditures. The creation of a research joint venture, or the existence 
of a less formal exchange of knowledge and experience does not determine the extent of efficiency-enhancing 
investment outlays of individual firms. Companies may decide about the size of their expenditures in a 
noncoordinated way, or could jointly set the level of research spending by forming an R&D cartel. 
The situation in a given industry depends, also, on the type of competition in the market for the final good. 
The same firms, that  undertake cooperation at the R&D stage, may apply different scope of coordination for 
their behavior on the final product market. Among a variety of possible actions, we may consider 
noncooperative, or collusive behavior of companies at the sales stage. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of the firms’ behavior in the final product market on their 
decisions at the R&D stage, with a special consideration of research joint ventures. We first analyze the 
Stackelberg-type competition of firms on the market, and identify the consequences of such noncooperative 
rivalry for the R&D decisions. Next, we consider the impact of cartel creation on the R&D investments, and 
compare it with the noncollusive situation. 
Analogously to the models introduced by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988, and by De Bondt and 
Veugelers, 1991, the analysis is conducted in a two-stage game with two firms as players. In the first stage, the 
companies simultaneously choose the level of R&D investments, and in the second stage they meet on the 
market for the final good. However, the type of noncooperative behavior analyzed by these authors has been 
limited to the Cournot model.‡ 
In this paper, we extend the analysis by introducing the Stackelberg competition in the product market. 
Unlike the previous literature, we assume that the production process is characterized by the quadratic cost 
functions, rather than the linear ones, i.e. the marginal costs are increasing. § We investigate whether the 
replacement of the linear costs by a quadratic function will have any impact on the key conclusions about the 
behavior of firms in the R&D stage. Since the algebraic solutions to the models discussed in this paper are 
hard to obtain, we limit our considerations to a numerical analysis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section focuses on the noncooperative competition 
of duopolists in the case of Stackelberg leader-follower behavior in the final product market. In section 3, we 
consider the conduct and performance of firms in a fully cartelized industry, i.e., in the case of collusion at the 
R&D stage as well as in the final good market. Based on the comparison of the above cases, we formulate 
conclusions regarding the cost-reducing investments of firms in section 4. The paper ends with a brief 
summary and conclusions. 
2. Quantity leadership 
Consider an industry with two firms, denoted 1 and 2. Each firm ݅ ሺ݅ ൌ ͳǡ ʹሻ  manufactures ݍ௜ units of an 
identical  product. An inverse demand function for the good is given in a linear form: 
݌ ൌ ܽ െ ܳ,                                                                               (1) 
where ݌ denotes the market price, ܳሺൌ ݍଵ ൅ ݍଶሻ is the total quantity demanded, and ܽ ሺܽ ൐ Ͳሻ is a given 
parameter. 
 
 
‡‡ These models have been further developed by, e.g., Kamien et al., 1992, who also considered the case of Bertrand competition. 
§ The Stackelberg competition in the context of R&D investments and cartelization of industries has been first considered by Prokop and 
Karbowski, 2013. These authors, however, assumed the linear cost functions. 
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The manufacturing costs of firm ݅ are characterized by a quadratic function in the following form: 
ܥ௜൫ݍ௜ǡ ݔ௜ ǡ ݔ௝൯ ൌ ௤೔
మ
௖ା௫೔ାఉ௫ೕ
 ,                                                                     (2) 
where ܿሺܿ ൏ ܽሻ is a given parameter of an initial efficiency of each firm, ݔ௜  denotes the amount of R&D 
investments made by the company i, and ݔ௝ denotes the amount of R&D investments made by the other firm. 
Parameter ߚ ሺͲ ൑ ߚ ൑ ͳሻ describes the size of research externalities, i.e. the benefits for a given company 
obtained as a result of R&D undertaken by the competitor. Higher level of ߚ means that investments in R&D 
made by one firm have a greater impact on cost reduction of the competitor. 
Firm ݅ incurs the costs of R&D investments according to the following quadratic function: 
ߛ ௫೔మଶ  ,                                                                                      (3) 
where ߛ ሺߛ ൐ Ͳሻ is a given parameter. 
We assume that there is no issue of entry to this industry. 
Initially, we consider the case when the competition of firms in this industry is characterized by quantity 
leadership in the final product market, i.e., firm 1, plays the role of the Stackelberg leader, and firm 2, is the 
follower. Thus, firm 1 is the first to set the level of its output, ݍଵ, and firm 2, knowing the production level 
chosen by the leader, decides about its own level of supply, ݍଶ. 
There are two stages of decision making by firms. At the first stage, both of them simultaneously and 
independently choose their levels of research investments, ݔ௜ . These decisions affect the levels of 
manufacturing costs of each firm. At the second stage, the companies meet in the final product market and 
behave according to the Stackelberg leadership model. 
In order to find equilibrium of the above game, we first consider the profit of the follower firm at the 
second stage for a given amount of research investments, ݔଵ and ݔଶ: 
ߨଶ ൌ ሺܽ െ ܳሻݍଶ െ ௤మ
మ
௖ା௫మାఉ௫భ െ ߛ
௫మమ
ଶ .                                                 (4) 
Given the output level of the leader, ݍଵ , the follower firm maximizes its own profit by setting the 
production level at: 
ݍଶ ൌ ሺ௔ି௤భሻሺ௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻଶሺଵା௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻ  ,                                                            (5) 
which is calculated by solving the first order optimality condition డగమడ௤మ ൌ Ͳ with respect to ݍଶ. 
Taking into account the reaction function of the follower described by (5), the leader maximizes its own 
profit for given levels of research investments ݔଵ and ݔଶ: 
ߨଵ ൌ ሺܽ െ ܳሻݍଵ െ ௤భ௖ା௫భାఉ௫మ െ ߛ
௫భమ
ଶ  .                                              (6) 
Thus, the profit given by (6) can be rewritten as a function of one variable, i.e., ݍଵ: 
ߨଵ ൌ ௤భሺ௔ି௤భሻሺଶା௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻଶሺଵା௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻ െ
௤భమ
௖ା௫భାఉ௫మ െ
ଵ
ଶ ߛݔଵଶ.                                 (7) 
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From the first order condition for profit maximization, ௗగభௗ௤భ ൌ Ͳ, the optimal output level for the leader is 
ݍଵ ൌ ௔ሺଶା௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻሺ௖ା௫భାఉ௫మሻଶ൫ሺଶା௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻሺ௖ା௫భାఉ௫మሻାଶሺଵା௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻ൯.                                      (8) 
By substituting (8) into (5), we obtain the optimal output of the follower: 
ݍଶ ൌ ௔ሺ௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻ൫ሺଶା௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻሺ௖ା௫భାఉ௫మሻାସሺଵା௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻ൯ସሺଵା௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻ൫ሺଶା௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻሺ௖ା௫భାఉ௫మሻାଶሺଵା௖ାఉ௫భା௫మሻ൯ .                          (9) 
The outputs ݍଵ and ݍଶ given by (8) and (9) constitute the Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium for given levels of 
research investments, ݔଵ and ݔଶ. 
After substituting (8) and (9) into (4) and (7), we obtain the profits of each firm, ߨଵ and ߨଶ, as functions of 
R&D investments, ݔଵ and ݔଶ. 
In the first stage of the game, when companies simultaneously decide about their research investments, ݔଵ 
and ݔଶ, the Nash equilibrium strategies are obtained as a solution to the following set of two equations in two 
unknowns, ݔଵ and ݔଶ: 
డగ೔
డ௫೔
ൌ Ͳ ,     ݅ ൌ ͳǡ ʹ .                    (10) 
Under certain conditions satisfied by the parameters ܽ , ܿ , ߛ  and ߚ  the above system has exactly one 
solution. Let’s denote it by ݔଵכ and ݔଶכ. Substituting the calculated values of R&D investments into (8) and 
(9), we obtain the equilibrium levels of output for the leader and the follower, ݍଵכ and ݍଶכ. From (1), we have 
the equilibrium price, ݌כ. Now, we can also calculate the equilibrium levels of profits, ߨଵכ and ߨଶכ. 
Since the algebraic solution of our model is practically hard to present due to the quadratic cost function, 
we will use a numerical analysis. In this paper, we consider the case of ܽ ൌ ͳͲͲ, ܿ ൌ ͳ, and ߛ ൌ ͳͲͲ. The 
equilibrium results for various levels of parameter ߚ are summarized in table 1. 
    Table 1. Stackelberg equilibrium for ܽ ൌ ͳͲͲ, ܿ ൌ ͳ, ߛ ൌ ͳͲͲ, and ߚ א ሾͲǡͳሿ 
ࢼ ࢞૚כ ࢞૛כ ࢗ૚כ ࢗ૛כ ࢖כ ࣊૚כ ࣊૛כ 
0,0 1,52056 1,29395 31,0813 23,9979 44,9208 897,32 743,24 
0,1 1,41384 1,16892 31,1151 24,0378 44,8471 912,92 759,60 
0,2 1,31797 1,05287 31,0998 24,0625 44,8377 925,08 773,53 
0,3 1,23122 0,94354 31,0362 24,0735 44,8902 934,32 785,59 
0,4 1,15244 0,83898 30,9233 24,0721 45,0046 940,95 796,22 
0,5 1,08099 0,73738 30,7582 24,0589 45,1829 945,12 805,76 
0,6 1,01675 0,63685 30,5360 24,0350 45,4290 946,83 814,51 
0,7 0,96040 0,53508 30,2487 24,0020 45,7493 945,88 822,77 
0,8 0,91386 0,42883 29,8840 23,9634 46,1526 941,77 830,92 
0,9 0,88167 0,31246 29,4207 23,9278 46,6515 933,46 839,52 
1,0 0,87486 0,17407 28,8178 23,9178 47,2645 918,47 849,75 
     Source: own calculations 
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Using table 1, we may analyze the impact of parameter ߚ, i.e. the size of externalities in R&D, on the 
equilibrium decisions of firms. The R&D investments decline with the increasing scale of knowledge 
spillovers. The relative research spendings of the follower decline significantly faster than the investments of 
the leader. In the case of a research joint venture, when the parameter ߚ equals 1, i.e., the externalities are 
fully internalized, the overall amount of research effort to reduce the manufacturing costs is the lowest. 
For the values of parameter ߚ greater than 0,3, an increase in the size of R&D externalities leads to a 
smaller supply of the final product by both firms. Each company supplies the smallest amount of the final 
product in the case of a joint venture, which translates into the highest market price. Thus, a research joint 
venture will lead to the smallest consumer surplus.  
The profit of each firm is affected by the parameter ߚ in different ways. On the one hand, the profit of the 
follower increases monotonically with a wider extent of research externalities, and achieves its maximum 
when the companies form a joint venture. On the other hand, the leader’s profit initially grows when the 
parameter ߚ increases, but it starts declining when this parameter exceeds 0,6. Thus, under the Stackelberg 
competition in the product market, a research joint venture is beneficial to the follower, but not attractive to 
the leader, who prefers only a medium level of technological spillovers. 
3. Cartelized industry 
Now, we consider the situation, in which both firms have colluded in the stage of R&D investments, as 
well as in the final product market. The demand function and the cost functions are assumed to be the same as 
in the previous section. 
Again, we proceed by applying backward analysis. In the second stage of the game, the firms choose their 
final output levels, ݍଵ and ݍଶ, for given amounts of research investments, ݔଵ and ݔଶ: 
ߨ ൌ ሺܽ െ ܳሻܳ െ ݍଵଶȀሺܿ ൅ ݔଵ ൅ ߚݔଶሻ െ ݍଶଶȀሺܿ ൅ ݔଶ ൅ ߚݔଵሻ െ ߛ ௫భ
మ
ଶ െ ߛ
௫మమ
ଶ  .                     (11) 
At the symmetric equilibrium point, i.e. when ݔଵ ൌ ݔଶ ൌ ݔ, the profit-maximizing output level for each 
company, i.e., ݍ ൌ ݍଵ ൌ ݍଶ, is obtained by solving the following first order condition with respect to ݍ: 
డగ
డ௤ ൌ Ͳ.                                                                       (12) 
By solving (12), we have: 
ݍ ൌ ݍଵ ൌ ݍଶ ൌ ௔ሺ௖ାሺଵାఉሻ௫ሻଶାସ௖ାସሺଵାఉሻ௫ .                                                         (13) 
After substituting (13) into the inverse demand function given by (1), we obtain the equilibrium market 
price for the final good as a function of ݔ: 
݌ ൌ ௔ሺଵା௖ାሺଵାఉሻ௫ሻଵାଶ௖ାଶሺଵାఉሻ௫  .                                                             (14) 
In the first stage of the game, when each firm chooses the research investments, ݔ, the companies’ joint 
profit is given by: 
ߨ ൌ ௔మଶ
௖ାሺଵାఉሻ௫
ଵାଶ௖ାଶሺଵାఉሻ௫ െ ߛݔଶ .                                                 (15) 
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Thus each of them will earn ߨଵ ൌ ߨଶ ൌ గଶ . 
To calculate the levels of R&D investments that maximize cartel profits, we solve the following first order 
condition with respect to ݔ: 
 డగడ௫ ൌ Ͳ.                                                                           (16) 
The obtained value of research investments undertaken by each firm in the cartelized industry, we denote 
by ݔ෤. After substituting ݔ෤ for ݔ into (13) and (14), we find the optimal output level of each company, ݍ෤, and 
the equilibrium market price, ݌෤, respectively. 
Using (15), we calculate the joint profit of colluded firms, ߨ෤ . Thus, we can find the individual profit of 
company i as ߨ෤௜ ൌ గ෥ଶ. 
Since a closed form solution of our model cannot be obtained due to the quadratic cost functions, again, we 
will use numerical analysis. For comparison, we consider the same set of values for our parameters, i.e., 
ܽ ൌ ͳͲͲ, ܿ ൌ ͳ, and ߛ ൌ ͳͲͲ. The equilibrium results for various levels of parameter ߚ are summarized in 
the table 2 below. 
              Table 2. Equilibrium of a cartelized industry for ܽ ൌ ͳͲͲ, ܿ ൌ ͳǡߛ ൌ ͳͲͲǡ ߚ א ሾͲǡͳሿ 
ࢼ ࢞෥ ࢗ෥࢏ ࢖෥ ࣊෥࢏ 
0,0 1,00000 20,0000 60,0000 950,00 
0,1 1,00917 20,2109 59,5782 959,62 
0,2 1,01512 20,4013 59,1975 968,54 
0,3 1,01864 20,5740 58,8520 976,82 
0,4 1,02032 20,7315 58,5370 984,52 
0,5 1,02057 20,8757 58,2485 991,71 
0,6 1,01972 21,0084 57,9833 998,43 
0,7 1,01802 21,1308 57,7384 1004,72 
0,8 1,01565 21,2442 57,5116 1010,63 
0,9 1,01276 21,3496 57,3009 1016,19 
1,0 1,00946 21,4478 57,1044 1021,44 
Source: own calculation 
Based on the table 2, we can characterize the impact of the size of research externalities on the equilibrium 
behavior of companies. In a fully cartelized industry, the amount of the R&D investments changes 
nonmonotonically. The lowest levels of cost-reducing expenditures take place when there are no research 
externalities, or when the companies form a research joint venture (ߚ ൌ ͳ). The highest values of R&D 
investments are expected for the medium values of knowledge spillovers. 
This result is significantly different from the case of linear manufacturing costs considered by 
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988, or Prokop and Karbowski, 2013. Under the assumption of the linear 
production costs, the research investments of cartel members grow together with the larger scale of 
knowledge spillovers and the largest size of investments by a cartel is expected when the firms formed a 
research joint venture. 
In the equilibrium of a cartelized industry, a greater size of research externalities makes each firm to 
produce a higher amount of the final output. It leads to a price reduction, but, we should stress, that the prices 
are still much higher than in the noncollusive case. The profits earn by each cartel firm are monotonically 
growing together with an increasing size of research spillovers. 
Despite the lowest cost-reducing investments made by firms in a research joint venture (ߚ ൌ ͳ), their 
supply of the final product is the largest, and their profits are the highest. 
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4. Incentives for technology improvements and industry cartelization 
Now, we may use the results of the analyzes contained in table 1 and table 2 to draw final conclusions 
about the incentives of firms to improve the technology, and to cartelize the industry. 
When the benefits of a firm from the research performed by the rival are relatively low ሺߚ ൏ Ͳǡ͸ሻ, the 
Stackelberg leader undertakes higher investments than a cartel firm  Also, the follower invests more than a 
cartel member, but only for ߚ ൏ Ͳǡ͵. 
For a large scale of the R&D externalities, the cost-reducing investments made by each firm in a fully 
cartelized industry are significantly higher than the research expenditures made by a company in an industry 
characterized by the Stackelberg behavior. In the case of a research joint venture, the companies forming a 
cartel in the R&D stage as well as in the product market invest more in technology improvements than the 
noncolluding firms.** However, despite the more efficient manufacturing process, the cartel firms sell their 
final product at a much larger price than the noncolluders. Thus, it is a less convenient situation for the buyers 
of the final good in this industry. 
No matter the size of research externalities, the profits of firms in a fully cartelized industry (the last 
column of table 2) is higher than the profit of the Stackelberg leader (the second to last column of table 1), or 
the profit of the follower (the last column of table 1). Moreover, the firms earn the highest amounts of profit 
when they coordinate their R&D efforts and production quantities within a cartel, and at the same time form a 
research joint venture in order to make a better use of knowledge exchange. As a result, we may expect that 
the tightening of cooperation in the R&D stage creates significant incentives for the firms to cartelize the 
industry. Thus, serious antitrust issues may emerge. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of companies’ behavior in the final good market on their decisions in 
the research and development phase under the assumption of quadratic costs of manufacturing. Our model 
leads to the conclusion that high levels of research externalities reduce the firms’ efforts to improve the 
production technology. The lowest values of R&D investments are expected to occur when the companies 
form a research joint venture. 
It should be stressed that the impact of research externalities on the behavior of cartel members in the R&D 
stage significantly depends on the form of the cost functions. When the production costs are linear, the 
research investments of the cartelized industry grow together with the larger scale of knowledge spillovers, 
and the largest size of investment by a cartel is expected when the firms form a research joint venture.†† 
However, when the manufacturing costs are quadratic, the companies that form a research joint venture in a 
fully cartelized industry generate the lowest levels of cost-reducing expenditures. 
Comparing a research joint venture in the case of the Stackelberg competition with the case of a fully 
cartelized industry, we find that a bigger size of R&D spendings can be observed under the collusive behavior 
of firms. 
The results presented in this paper are mostly based on a limited numerical analysis. In the next step, it is 
necessary to analyze the robustness of our conclusions to the changes of the main parameters of the model. 
 
 
** A similar result has been obtained by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988 in the case of linear production costs. 
†† Compare Prokop and Karbowski, 2013. 
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Among the additional directions for future research regarding the R&D cooperation and industry 
cartelization, other types of competition among firms should be considered, i.e. price leadership.‡‡ Moreover, 
the analysis of firms’ incentives to cartelize industries as a result of cooperation in the research and 
development stage should be continued. 
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